2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

from the original prophets of Communism.[1] Responses to Soviet challenges of this nature are sometimes as involved as the sentences and sentiments which provoke them. With both sides, as it were, throwing words into a machine, it seems all too likely that it is not in human nature to listen, and that the propagandists are wasting their time. Unless one can shut down, even for a moment, all the surface clatter of these well-worn abstractions, it is impossible to hear the rhythm of the life behind. Yet, though for a time it may seem to be drowned in the noise of the machines, that music can still echo faintly for him who has ears to hear.

A final thought of a general kind is this. So far, I have tried to depict the influences which shaped the lives of the people of Central Asia in the sequence of some sort of chronological order. This way of looking at things has even served to some extent when we came to examine the confused conflicts between Communism and Turkish nationalism during the interregnum period. There is of course also a chronology in the thirty years of the Soviet era which followed the first consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia in 1922. As, for instance, the period from 1922 to 1928 was occupied mainly with the territorial establishment of new republics, the 'rooting' of the Party, and the nationalization of land and water; the periods 1928–32 and 1933–7 were those of the first and second Five-Year Plans, with collectivization of agriculture and suppression of nomadism in the countryside and the rapid creation of an urban proletariat by means of redeployment of population to serve industry; the periods 1938–41 and 1941–5 represented the third Five-Year Plan (broken off by the War) and the War period, and saw a large increase in production of coal, oil and heavy industry generally under the spur of war needs and evacuation of industry from Europe; lastly, the period 1946–50 is that of the fourth Five-Year Plan, which set targets for the over-all increase of industrial output in Central Asia by 80 per cent.[1]

[1] A good example: 'It is the establishment, by means of the collectivization of the rural proletariat, of the forms of practical application of a complete and good measure directly answering the requirements of today which is at stake'.

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

287 technique primarily for the making of floor-
352 coverings. The fact that Sir Aurel Stein discovered fragments of pile rugs during his excavations of the stations along the ancient silk road through Eastern Turkestan, distinctly points to the origin of the technique among the nomads of Central Asia. Apart from that, nothing certain is known of the origin and development of the different kinds of Turkoman rugs. Some examples may date back to the early eighteenth century. That is, however, no more than surmise, probable though
287 it may be. The one established fact is that all
178 the good examples of the craft now in existence must have been made before the seventies of the last century, that is to say, before the conquest of the country by the Russians. The reason for this is the complete transformation of the life of the Turkoman tribes under Russian rule. As the Russians put an end to the activities of the Turkomans as caravan robbers and slave traders, they were obliged to cast about for some other means of livelihood. From that time on the burden of providing a substitute for the gains formerly achieved by robbery fell to the women, whose skill in carpet-knotting was exploited. Carpets of huge size were made for the palaces of Russian nobles and generals. In time the desire to execute these profitable orders as speedily as possible led to a decline in the great care formerly exercised in the making of Turkoman rugs.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

701 177 363 their ethnic separateness. For many a Muslim, entry into military service represents the first contact with an alien nationality. The Muslim recruit is expected at once to understand Russian commands, even though he is often completely ignorant of Russian. This linguistic difficulty, coupled with the general ineptitude of most Central Asian Muslims for army life (due to the exemption granted them in tsarist days), makes military service for many a shocking and bewildering experience. Sooner or later, however, most Muslims, except the dullest or most recalcitrant, learn enough Russian to get along and communicate with their Russian superiors and comrades. Several of the refugees stated that they had first learned Russian in the army; for some others, the army was actually the first experience with life outside their own Muslim communities. On many recruits the effect of such an experience, though violent, is not long-lasting; having completed his military service, the recruit returns to his village and soon forgets most of what he has learned. For others, however, it constitutes a radical break which affects their entire life. The Red army represents the only Soviet institution — save for the forced labor camps — where Muslim and Russian societies are forcibly compressed together, and where the cultural and ethnic walls usually separating them are to some extent broken down.

697 563 Evidence obtained from refugees who had lived in Soviet concentration camps and Nazi prisoner-of-war camps indicates that in conditions of great distress the ethnic barriers break down most rapidly, for in neither was there much separation between Muslims and Russians.[12] After an initial period of very harsh treatment by the Germans as "Asiatics," the Central Asians were separated out by the Germans under the influence of Turkestani émigré organizations and were formed into numerous small military units, commanded by Germans; these units served as military police and anti-partisan units and in some cases as front-line combat units.

178 162 An important factor in the demography of Central Asia is the settlement of the nomadic and seminomadic populations of the steppe and desert regions. The abandonment of nomadic habits had begun long before the Revolution; one of the main themes in the entire history of the Turkic tribes since their appearance in Central Asia and the Middle East a thousand years ago is the gradual transition from pure nomadism to a settled existence. This process was in part caused by the encroachment of agricultural peoples of neighboring territories upon the extensive nomadic lands, with the resultant shrinkage of grazing areas, and in part by the economic advantages to be derived from a combination of cattle and sheep

697 563 [12] More recent evidence, however, indicates that this has not been the case in Soviet forced labor camps since World War II. Repatriated inmates of Vorkuta, one of the largest Soviet forced labor camps, indicate that national differences are very prominent in the camp, and the prisoners tend to group strictly along national or religious lines. See, for instance, J. Scholmer, *Vorkuta* (New York, 1955). It is not certain whether this contradiction is due to some unknown factors operating in post-World War II camps, or whether there is no clear-cut pattern permitting generalization on this subject.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

herding with agriculture. Both these factors caused a rapid decline in nomadism in Central Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, under Russian rule. In 1926 (i.e., on the eve of collectivization) in Kazakhstan — the main area of nomadism — 26 percent of all the Kazakh families were fully settled, 66 percent practiced nomadism in the summers (transhumance), and only the remaining 6 percent to 8 percent were nomadic the year around. Of the major group, i.e., those practicing summer nomadism, more than two-thirds moved within a 25-kilometer radius of their winter quarters.[13] Soviet collectivization thus completed a process of settlement that was already well on its way, and given another few decades might have been accomplished quite naturally. A by-product of settlement is the decline of the tribe as a unit of social organization, and with it the disappearance of the tribal divisions and feuds which in the past have constituted one of the most serious deterrents to the development of a national consciousness among the Central Asian natives. The natives of the steppe and desert chafe greatly under the severe limitations imposed upon their movement by the Soviet regime, and, given freedom, would probably like to return at least in part to some form of nomadism; nevertheless, the tribal structure is probably destroyed beyond repair. This fact greatly strengthens the development of modern nationalism.

Thus, despite the considerable Russian influx into Central Asia, the Muslims living there appear to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This is thanks both to the character of Russian settlement, which leads to the establishment of Russian centers *side by side* rather than *among* the natives, and to the wide cultural gap, which hinders intermarriage and more intimate social contact. Indeed, it may be said that Russian migration and Soviet policies have rather contributed to the development of national consciousness, first by exposing all natives to contact with representatives of an alien culture and thus forcing them to question their own status, and secondly by helping to destroy — through settlement — the tribal divisions which had always been a most formidable obstacle to native unity vis-à-vis the foreigner.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

An important factor in the transformation of an ethnic group into a full-fledged nation with a developed sense of national consciousness is an articulate class with sufficient education and experience to provide the population with intellectual leadership. In societies which have only recently begun to undergo such a transformation, this function is usually assumed by what the Russians call "intelligentsia" — a class composed of individuals of diverse social background whom a common middle or higher education, qualifying it for professional or white-collar work, turns into a new social estate.

[13] *10 let Kazakhstana*, pp. 82–83.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

177 without the surrender of the local ethos. It is strongest and most vital in
668 societies which, like the mid-20th-century Muslims of Central Asia, are in the very throes of this process of cultural fusion.

The Russian influx, uninterrupted since the beginning of the present
167 century, does not hinder this development except where it is accompanied by
177 large-scale physical destruction of the natives (as was the case with the
668 Kazakhs). On the contrary, it rather strengthens it. In the Central Asian context, the Russian population with its Russian culture must be regarded primarily as an agent of Westernization, and hence as a force accelerating the transition of the natives to full-fledged nationhood. The Russians not only tend to promote the spread of such ideas as secularism, utility, and anti-traditionalism, but also by their very presence and cultural cohesion, to induce the native to define his own national status. The Russian influx thus has not led to the emergence of a new, third nationality, "Soviet" in its culture, but to the split of the population of Central Asia into two parts: this split has tended to crystallize the national consciousness of both groups.

178 Without indulging in the dangerous and fruitless game of prediction
668 (which always presupposes some degree of historical pre-determination),
648 it is still possible, on the basis of the evidence adduced above, to arrive at some general political conclusions from the cultural tendencies discernible in Soviet Central Asia.

In the first place, Soviet Central Asia may be expected to grow in importance as an internal problem for the regimes, present and future, ruling Russia and its possessions. The Muslim natives, formed into full-fledged nationalities with settled populations, well-defined cultures, and indigenous intelligentsias, will be far more troublesome to their rulers than the disunited, half-nomadic, Islam-dominated Muslim tribes and ethnic groups of the past have been. In the second place, the entire area of Central Asia, including Chinese Turkestan with which Russian Central Asia has always been closely connected, may well tend to move with time in the direction of independent statehood. It is not inconceivable that this vast territory may same day be encompassed in a new Turkic, Muslim state, oriented toward the Middle East, and serving as a buffer among Russia, China, and India. In the past this has been prevented by Russian conquest and Russia's policy of supporting Chinese authority in Sinkiang out of fear of British and Japanese activity in this sensitive region. With Britain and Japan out of Central Asia, Russo-Chinese cooperation may be less intensive than before, and any possible disagreements among the great powers bordering on this area will only benefit the national aspirations of the local Muslims. Whether or not this will occur cannot, of course, be foreseen. But so long as the Central Asian Muslims continue to preserve their cultural peculiarities and, under Communist pressures, to evolve the characteristics of modern nationalities, as they have done in Soviet territories, so long will the cultural and ethnic bases for such a development be present.